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This paper explores how mission statements might become a resource for improving 
nonprofit governance and accountability.  The author asks what legal duty – or moral obligation 
– nonprofit organizations should be under to articulate a mission statement that others (the 
government, donors, prospective beneficiaries, the public at large) could use to assess their goals 
and performance.  The paper explores how mission statements might include auditable claims, 
rather than vague aspirations, and raises questions about how various stakeholders might be 
empowered to use mission statements in holding an organization to account. 
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Jerusalem House provides a warm, caring home for homeless people with AIDS that allows them 
to retain their independence and dignity. 
 
The Network of Hope exists to promote Lasting Change in the lives of individuals, families and 
communities.
 
Grail Family Services fosters learning and the empowerment of vulnerable families with young 
children through the delivery of programs that educate, develop leadership skills, and build a 
sense of community. 
 
 
Nonprofit organizations generally announce “mission statements” – usually comprised by 
descriptions of some combination of their intended or ongoing activities and the results they 
hope will flow from them.  Many are inspirational, presumably seeking to motivate potential 
supporters, workers, and volunteers.  Some are general, with mainly broad and relatively abstract 
statements; others are highly specific and focused. 
 
How should we interpret an organization’s mission statement – from a moral and legal 
standpoint?  To what extent should we imagine that mission statements are or should be a 
reliable basis for understanding what a nonprofit organization seeks to accomplish and/or how it 
intends to go about it?  What legal duty – or moral obligation – should nonprofits be under to 
articulate a mission statement … and to what extent ought others (the government, donors, 
prospective beneficiaries, the public at large, …) be invited to place reliance on an organization’s 
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statement of its mission?  Or, to put it the other way around – should nonprofit organizations be 
required to articulate a mission statement on which others are invited or allowed to place 
reliance?  If so, what form of statement should be required?  What forms of reliance – and what 
forms of enforcement – would it be appropriate (or most socially beneficial) to create? 
 
This paper explores the possibility that nonprofits should – and perhaps should even be required 
to – articulate a mission statement that can be relied upon as a promise to deliver specified social 
value.  It raises the possibility that we should define two forms of nonprofit organizations – (1) 
those operating largely independently of public support; and (2) those materially supported by 
public treasuries.  Those not relying on public support would be invited to pursue, within broad 
boundaries, their own ideas of what is in the public interest.  By contrast, those accepting 
significant levels of public funds might be asked to meet different standards for establishing that 
the interests they were pursuing were indeed public interests and for showing that they were 
serving those interests efficiently and/or effectively.  When a socially-oriented nonprofit 
organization accepts significant funding from the public treasury, what reciprocal responsibility 
does it undertake to align its actions with interests seen by others as socially important?  To what 
extent should it be asked to demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness at serving those 
interests?  What would be appropriate mechanisms for scrutinizing or authorizing the actions of 
such organizations?  Or would the gains from greater alignment of the “public” spending with 
public interests be overshadowed by the inefficiencies provided by greater oversight – so that we 




The status quo ante 
 
Under current federal US tax law, nonprofit organizations are permitted to organize to pursue 
any of a very broad collection of charitable interests.  In order to qualify as tax-exempt 
organizations the contributions to which are deductible from donors’ incomes, they must 
designate a mission that fits within the IRS’ Congressionally mandated and very broadly drawn 
list of charitable purposes, and if they subsequently decide to change the focus of their activities 
they must submit a description of the changes (so that the IRS can affirm that the new collection 
also lies within the quite broad zone of what is federally authorized).  Their stated intentions – to 
operate programs on behalf, for example, of disadvantaged children – create an obligation to 
establish, operate, or participate in programs that can reasonably be described as for the benefit 
of disadvantaged children, but creates no obligation to the intended beneficiaries actually to 
produce benefits for them.  The organization is free to define practically anything it wants to as a 
“benefit,” and to work on producing it – there is no requirement that it succeed, even on its own 
terms … and certainly no obligation to test its interpretation of what a “benefit” is against the 
views of either intended beneficiaries or of the interested public.  Donors have standing to protest 
legally if they feel that the agreements made with them about the activities to be undertaken have 
not been honored – but the intended beneficiaries have no right to complain if they do not view 
the activities undertaken on their behalf as effective, or even if they do not regard them as a 
benefit at all.  As recipients of charity, it is not up to them to have a view about what is being 




Social value production as fundamental purpose 
 
Since societies constitute legal organizations (private for-profit organizations, nonprofit 
organizations, and governmental entities) – setting the terms and conditions on which they are 
permitted to be established, and the legal frameworks within which they are permitted to operate 
– we can suppose that the purpose of all organizations can be understood to be the production of 
social value (broadly defined to include both publicly-valued private interests and broader 
collective social interests).  In some cases, society may seek to serve social interests by allowing 
organizations to pursue the private interest of the individuals involved.  Under standard 
economic theories of free market competition, for example, it can be argued that constituting 
private sector for-profit organizations owned by (and legally bound to serve the interests of) 
private investors by creating products and seeking and serving customers in competitive markets 
will be an effective way to advance (1) the private wealth interests of investors, (2) the 
consumption interests of consumers, and (3) the income and employment interests of the 
organization’s employees.  So long as society treats the private income and consumption 
interests of private citizens as valuable, these “private” organizations, driven by private motives, 
are in fact serving public interests. 
 
The link to the production of social value is more direct for nonprofit organizations; at least 
nominally, they are typically established specifically for the purpose of advancing wider social 
interests – at least, that is the notion embedded in the tax laws under which they are generally 
chartered and organized.  Two major forms of public value can be generated by nonprofit 
organizations.  First, they can produce what has been referred to as “expressive value” for their 
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donors and supporters – they constitute an opportunity to engage in public speech affirming 
particular values and ideas that their organizers believe in and want to propound.  In societies 
valuing free expression, this can be interpreted as a social purpose in and of itself – whether or 
not other services or benefits are generated for others.  Second, they can produce products or 
services that are of direct benefit to individuals or groups that society has determined are worthy 
of social interest (and thus designated as appropriate recipients of charitable action). 
 
Asserting the public claim 
 
On what basis could governmental authorities – or the public – assert that nonprofits owe the 
world a promise of social benefit?  To the extent that the organization acts independently, on its 
own volition and with its own resources, we might conclude that no obvious public claim on its 
intentions, activities, or results has been created.  If, by contrast, the public – in the form of its 
resources, authority, authorization, assumption or limitation of liability, or otherwise is 
significantly involved in “supporting” the organization, then we might reasonably inquire about 
what reciprocal obligation that support creates on the part of the nonprofit. 
 
There is a wide spectrum of degrees of public involvement in and public financial support for 
nonprofit organizations.  At one end lies the independent, self-sustaining nonprofit organization:  
When individuals self-organize in a free society into groups and seek to produce something that 
is in their judgment good for the society – or simply act in ways that serves their own expressive 
purpose – there is no obvious basis for a claim by others on their effort, resources, activities, or 
results.  It seems reasonable to interpret constitutional protections on freedom of expression and 
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association to permit individuals and groups to organize themselves, using only their own 
resources, to do more or less whatever they want (within the confines of what are generally 
legally permitted activities). 
 
At the other end of this continuum lies the contract-based agency.  Consider a nonprofit 
organization that is directly receiving public funds to carry out a specified program.  Here, it 
would seem completely appropriate to consider the acceptance of public funding as creating an 
obligation that at a minimum would include carrying out specified activities, and might perhaps 
include attaining specified results.  Indeed, such arrangements are generally codified in the form 
of contracts that specify either the activities to be undertaken, or the results to be achieved, or 
some combination of the two – and thus create an enforceable promise by the nonprofit service 
provider that enters into the contract. 
 
Where, then, does the traditional 501(c)3 nonprofit organization fit on this spectrum?  An 
alternative to organizing under the tax code as a nonprofit organization would be to organize as a 
(not-very-profitable) for-profit organization to pursue whatever social benefits its organizers 
wish to generate.  What is different by reason of choosing to organize instead as a nonprofit 
under the tax law?  There are at least five potentially significant ways in which the qualifying 
501(c)3 differs from private sector organizations: 
 
(1) no one owns the residual income or accumulated surplus of the organization – the board 
of directors or trustees are charged in perpetuity to use the organization’s resources for 
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the public purposes for which the organization was created, and transactions for the 
benefit of others (directors, employees, donors, …) are prohibited; 
 
(2) the liabilities of trustees or board members and management employees are limited so 
long as they act in good faith to discharge the charitable intent of the organization; 
 
(3) any net earnings of the organization pursuant to its charitable purpose are exempt from 
income taxation; 
 
(4) contributions to the organization are deductible from taxable income before tax is 
computed and from estate value before inheritance taxes are computed. 
 
(5) property owned by nonprofit organizations that is used in the direct service of its mission 
is (commonly) exempt from property taxes. 
 
The first of these – the prohibition of individual gain from the activities of the organization 
(through residual ownership of the surplus or through self-dealing) – establishes the nature of the 
organization and its incentives, insuring that the organization’s interests are not aligned with any 
other individual or organization’s interests (though not exactly guaranteeing that they are aligned 
instead with the production of the social value for which the organization was chartered – that is 
left to the board of directors or trustees to arrange).  This would not seem by itself to create any 
obvious obligation – other than to serve the stated charitable interests of the organization as well 
as they reasonably are able. 
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 By contrast, the other four major departures all constitute forms of direct public support for the 
organization.  The limitation of or indemnity from liability for trustees is effectively a free 
insurance policy, worth whatever the premiums would be on a policy providing similar 
protection from the risk of lawsuits; this is probably not a hugely significant subsidy, but it is at 
least a minor form of public support.  Exclusion of net earnings from exposure to income 
taxation may be a larger subsidy from the public treasury (equal in value to the taxes that would 
otherwise have had to have been paid on net earnings), but since organizations that are 
constituted for a public purpose (and which by law cannot direct their net accumulated resources 
to other individuals or groups) have no incentive not to spend their funds on behalf of their stated 
purposes, and since they can generally find ways to spend down any surplus they generate, their 
average net incomes over time are likely to be small (or could be arranged to be small), so the 
subsidy flowing from exemption from income taxation on the net earnings of the organization is 
not as large as it might at first seem. 
 
The ability of donors to exclude contributions to qualified 501(c)3s from their income before 
calculating taxes – and, similarly, from their estates before inheritance taxes are computed – is a 
considerably larger benefit.  In effect, the federal government (and some state governments) 
provide a matching donation to the charity of the donor’s choice when a contributor takes 
advantage of these tax benefits.  Consider a donor in a 35 percent tax bracket who writes a check 
for $10,000 to a qualified charity, and takes a charitable deduction for this amount on her federal 
income tax return.  The interaction of income, other deductions, tax brackets, and other features 
of the federal income tax imply that the net reduction in her taxes could vary considerably 
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(though in general there will be a significant reduction, and it could approach 35 percent of her 
gift).  For simplicity, assume that the net reduction is 25 percent of the gift amount, or $2,500. 
The actual cost of the gift to her is thus $7,500; the remaining $2,500 that the organization 
received came, in effect, from the federal treasury – or, to put it more bluntly, from other federal 
taxpayers.  Thus, the organization has actually received a charitable gift in the amount of $7,500 
from a donor who chose to support it, matched by a 1:3, or 33 percent matching grant of $2,500 
from taxpayers who did not specifically choose to support this particular charity (though we 
should observe, in fairness, that they did agree, in general terms, to the establishment of this 
broad matching grant scheme to support qualifying charities in general who receive intentional 
donations from other taxpayers). 
 
Given the higher marginal tax rates imposed through the gift and estate taxes on large transfers 
of wealth, the “matching rate” for charitable contributions made at death are even higher.  For 
taxpayers with the largest estates, facing tax rates of 55 percent, a $1 million contribution to a 
qualifying organization from an estate costs $450,000; the remaining $550,000 received by the 
organization comes from the federal government, which is thus matching the donation at a match 
rate of 1.22:1, or over 120 percent. 
 
Having the federal government (and some state governments) as a more or less silent partner 
matching donations at something ranging from 20 percent to over 100 percent (depending on the 
circumstances of the intentional donor) amounts to an enormous subsidy from the public treasury 
to support the activities of qualifying charities.  For example, the Office of Management and 
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Budget estimates that the foregone federal income tax alone resulting from charitable deductions 
in fiscal year 2006 is about $40 billion.1
 
The common (state-law based) exemption of property owned by nonprofit organizations (and 
used directly in their charitable activities, in contrast to those held for investment purposes) from 
local property taxes also amounts to a considerable subsidy – this time mainly from the treasuries 
of municipal governments (which, not incidentally, play little or no direct role in the 
determination of eligibility for these subsidies, and can do little to control the amount of tax-
exempt property owned within their jurisdictions).  The amount of tax that would have been 
owed on these properties if they had not been owned by qualifying nonprofit organizations is a 
direct subsidy to them – and given the way local property taxes are set (with the total burden 
being spread across all taxable property), this subsidy is paid directly by the other taxpayers of 
the local jurisdiction in which the qualifying nonprofit organization owns tax-exempt property.  
Thus, Harvard University and MIT, which own literally billions of dollars worth of what would 
otherwise be taxable property used in pursuit of their educational missions in Cambridge, are 
being directly subsidized by the town’s other taxpayers. 
 
What (if any) responsibilities and obligations are entailed by the receipt of public 
subsidies? 
 
The combination of these forms of subsidy – free insurance, the ability to accumulate earnings 
free of tax (for a public purpose only, to be sure), matching grants from federal (and some state) 
                                                 
1 Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives appendix to Budget of the United States Government 
FY 2007, pp 287-290. 
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income taxpayers and from federal (and some state) inheritance taxpayers, and property tax 
subsidies from nearby property-owning residents and businesses – amounts to quite substantial 
support of the charitable sector by a wide array of taxpayers (as, indeed, it is no doubt intended 
to).  What, if any, obligations or responsibilities would it be reasonable or appropriate for the 
nonprofit to assume as a result?  The intentional donors have standing to insist that their funds be 
used according to their agreed terms, including what programs are to be operated, what benefits 
produced, what beneficiaries served – what say should the matching donors or nearby residents 
who are covering what would have been the organization’s property taxes have in determining 
what programs their contributions should support, how the programs should operate, or who 
should benefit from them?  Intentional donors may be able to get recipient organizations to agree 
to develop (and share with them) data on performance and results (and can withhold their 
contributions if the organization will not agree) – what access to such data should the matching 
donors have?  More generally, what forms of accountability would be appropriate for nonprofit 
organizations that are receiving significant public taxpayer-funded subsidies? 
 
Accountability can be defined in terms of four attributes: 
 
(1) To whom?  To what individual or group is the organization to answer, or present its 
“accounting” of its activities and/or results? 
 
(2) For what?  Which responsibilities is the organization held accountable for – financial 
integrity? carrying out particular activities?  achieving specified results? 
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(3) With what form and level of detail of descriptive information (within what 
“information regime”)?  What dimensions of description is the organization to render?  
Does it have to report on its financial flows, and if so in what ways and at what level of 
detail?  Does it have to report on its activities?  Its results? 
 
(4) With what sanctions?  If the individual or group to whom the organization is 
accountable does not approve of the organization’s degree of transparency, the form or 
nature or depth of its reports, the activities it is engaged in, its assessment of results, or 
its achievements – if, in short, it objects to some aspect of the accounting that is 
presented to it – then what sanctions, powers, or methods of influence does it have 
available to it to require or encourage what it judges would be a better job by the 
accountor? 
 
If we accept the premise that the level of public subsidy provided to nonprofit organizations 
warrants some form of accountability to the taxpayer supporters, then we can reasonably inquire 
about what the alternatives are under each of these four accountability attributes: to whom, for 
what, within the setting of what provided information, and in the context of what sanctions? 
 
To Whom, and For What? 
 
Currently, nonprofit organizations are principally accountable to their donors.  Their trustees or 
board members are charged with insuring that the organization is serving its articulated mission 
(as stated or restated by the same trustees or board, from time to time).  This is their fiduciary 
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public duty, but there is precious little opportunity or standing for anyone else to make a 
judgment about how well it is being discharged or to press the organization or its board or 
trustees to improve performance.  Nonprofits do face, in addition, requirements to report to the 
IRS about their activities, but this is mainly focused on insuring that they are not engaged in self-
dealing, and involves practically no examination of whether their approach to their mission is 
sensible and effective (or even much about whether it is being carried out) – so long as the 
money isn’t being misappropriated in some way, the tax authorities are generally satisfied.  The 
current answer to the first part of the accountability question, thus, is that nonprofits owe 
accountability to donors, for honoring gift agreements, and to public tax authorities, for 
reasonable financial integrity and avoidance of self-dealing and theft.  Donors could, in their 
contribution agreements, insist on higher levels of accountability – requiring the organization to 
report on performance and achievements, for example – and only then would the organization 
owe that higher standard of accounting to anyone, and even then it would only have to provide it 
to its donors. 
 
Since taxpayers are also contributors to these same organizations, those nonprofits that accept 
public funds to support their activities and help them advance stated purposes – as we have 
argued 501(c)3 organizations should be understood to be doing – might reasonably be held to 
account to their “other” supporters/“donors” – the taxpayers providing the subsidies they receive.  
This would follow even under the existing theory of accountability (that organizations are 
accountable to their donors), if we simply recognize that taxpayers are in the position of making 
matching donations and thus might reasonably expect to be rendered an accounting as well.  And 
this would presumably involve more than simply accounting for the spending itself.  The subsidy 
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is granted to help the organization to achieve its stated mission – and the taxpayers providing the 
subsidy thus have a legitimate interest in knowing whether it is being served effectively and 
efficiently or not.  Thus, a more detailed accounting – of activities and results – to the taxpaying 
supporters of the enterprise would seem to be in order. 
 
Since the public purpose to be served by the organization – and the presumptive reason for the 
public subsidies involved – is ultimately to serve the stated beneficiaries, it might seem sensible 
for there to be some role for the views of beneficiaries in examining the performance of the 
enterprise as well.  Recipients – on whose behalf the activities were, at least nominally, 
undertaken, will often have information about how effective the services or programs have been.  
In addition, they may have useful information about priorities, about the choice of which 
socially-valuable benefits it is most important to produce.  Recipients might agree that the 
organization is producing the benefits it says it is, but believe that other benefits that are more 
important to them should be produced instead.  That is, recipients may have judgments both 
about how well the mission is being served and about whether the mission itself should be 
changed. 
 
Recipients, of course, will not always have good information about either priorities or results.  In 
addition, they have an intrinsic conflict of interest with the organizations that serve them – they 
might, in principle, be just as happy (or even happier) to have their individual interests (rather 
than the broader social interests) served by the programs, and might thus constitute a force for 
moving programs toward serving narrower personal and individual interests and moving away 
from broader social interests.  Thus, it may be most appropriate to include the views of recipients 
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as information to be considered by the taxpaying “donors” supporting the programs (rather than 
to define recipients themselves as a group by whom the organization may also be held to 
account). 
 
Thus, the expanded answer to the first two accountability questions is that organizations that are 
accepting significant levels of public taxpayer funding should be accountable to the larger public 
that is supporting them – and they should be accountable for an explanation and justification of 
both their selection of purposes to be served and of their efficiency and effectiveness in serving 
those purposes. 
 
Exactly how should the “larger public” that is contributing to the funding for the nonprofit 
organization be constituted for purposes of receiving (and reacting to) the enterprise’s accounting 
of its activities and results?  Obviously, there is a wide range of possible approaches, ranging 
from appointing professional officers of the IRS to represent the public’s interests in this regard 
to forming a public committee of interested parties not involved in the organization to receive 
and respond to its description.  It might be a desirable (or required) feature of such a committee 
that it include representatives of the intended beneficiaries. 
 
Within what information regime – and with what sanctions? 
 
What information would nonprofit organizations then need to provide to those to whom they are 
being accountable?  If they are to be accountable for the purposes they select and the progress 
they make toward their stated goals, those holding them accountable must have some ability to 
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understand both activities and results.  Thus, nonprofits accepting public funding would need to 
disclose descriptions of their flows of funding (as they do now), their activities, and measures of 
their results. 
 
As with the nature of the committee that would receive the organization’s accounting for itself, 
there is a wide range of possible sanctions that could be within the authority of the oversight 
organization to impose.  Most obviously, its continued approval might be required to retain the 
tax-privileged status of the organization.  Such approval could be structured with differing levels 
of presumption in favor of the organization’s efforts – for example, a significant supermajority of 
the body might be required to suspend the deductibility of contributions to the organization. 
 
Mission statements as promises 
 
If nonprofits receiving tax subsidies are to be made subject to external review of their chosen 
purposes and results – broadly speaking, for their performance – then they will need to be 
assured that they are not going to be held to arbitrary goals not of their choosing.  In order to 
make this higher level of scrutiny more feasible, we might permit the organization to specify the 
terms on which it is prepared to be held accountable.  For example, a homeless shelter could 
define its mission for a given year in terms of the number of bed-nights available, the number of 
homeless people served, and so on. 
 
One way in which to implement this would be to ask (or require) tax-subsidized nonprofit 
organizations to produce a mission statement with what we might term an “auditable impact 
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claim.”  What is it that they expect to accomplish over the coming year that we can reasonably 
measure, assess, and verify?  Their impact claim is an assertion of what results they intend to 
produce.  They may have (and state) other, broader goals.  For example, the homeless shelter that 
states as its impact claim that it will have 15,000 bed-nights available over the course of the year 
may also have as one of its goals that it will successfully move more than 100 homeless people 
into permanent housing that lasts for more than 6 months – but they may choose not to specify 
that as part of their auditable, stated, impact claim.   
 
In effect, the stated auditable impact claim would become a promise by the organization about its 
activities and performance.  It would get to choose what its mission statement – in the form of an 
auditable claim about the results it will achieve – includes (and does not include).  Having set 
forth its current mission in this form, however, its specified claim would be viewed as a promise 
rather than merely as an aspiration. 
 
What form of claim – activities, or results? 
 
Ideally, nonprofits receiving tax subsidies would set out auditable claims of results that they 
promise to achieve.  In practice, however, it is generally easier to measure, demonstrate, and 
audit levels of activity than it is to assess actual results.  Consider, for example, the homeless 
shelter that maintains available beds and provides temporary housing and meals.  Are these 
activities, or results?  In some cases, the distinction is semantic – while serving a meal is an 
activity, providing nutrition could be viewed as a result.  For obviously beneficial activities with 
tightly-linked results (vaccinations and immunity and reduction in the incidence of diseases, for 
19 
example), the distinction may not be important.  In other cases, the distinction is important but 
the measurability of the results is low.  For example, one reason for providing temporary shelter 
is to help families in crisis to stabilize their situations and move to permanently improved 
circumstances – but that “result” will generally take longer to appear, will be harder to measure, 
and may be harder to attribute to the work of the homeless shelter per se.  Thus, while we might 
like to focus on the farther downstream “results,” we may often have to settle for assessing 
activities that we can reasonably hope are tied to the results we aspire to.  To those articulating 
“impact claims,” it will generally feel less risky to make assertions about activities than about 
their consequences.  Thus, the nonprofits we ask to make impact claims will often couch them in 
terms of activities they intend to conduct, while their overseers should generally want them to 
focus on, measure, manage for, and produce actual consequences.   
 
What form of “mission statement”? 
 
If mission statements are to be promises, then the nonprofits articulating those mission 
statements are likely to be very careful about the nature of the claims they advance.  Mission 
statements, as currently produced, range across a wide range of forms and levels of abstraction.  
At least three elements are common (though rarely does any one mission statement include all 
three): 
 
(1) A “destination vision” (an image of how the world will look if the organization 
succeeds in its mission): “we foresee a city where the playgrounds are safe and a 
meeting ground for a diverse collection of neighborhood children …” 
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(2) A “role vision” (a description of what part of the broader challenge this organization 
will take responsibility for): “we organize afterschool enrichment programs to help 
inner city kids develop better math skills…” 
(3) An “operational vision” (a more detailed picture of the actual activities that will be 
undertaken): “we run chess competitions at six junior high schools in the Dundalk 
area…” 
 
Generally, destination visions are too broad to provide auditable claims of results, and 
operational visions are so tactical that they may provide auditable activity claims, but will not 
generally frame true results claims.  Role visions often contain an aspirational statement about 
results (“better math skills”) in the context of a description of the role the organization will take 
in trying to achieve those results.  Thus, trying to codify a “role vision” into a reasonably 
concrete results claim may be the most productive way to build a true “impact claim.” 
 
Voluntary and mandatory approaches 
 
Treating mission statements as promises could be implemented either voluntarily and 
individually, or by legal mandate (presumably, through a change in the tax law governing 
nonprofit tax status).  Nonprofit organizations could reach for higher standards of accountability, 
among other approaches, by: 
 
(1) developing and articulating auditable claims of intended results; 
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(2) organizing external groups designed to represent the broader public interest, reporting 
to them on their activities and their results, and discussing with them the 
establishment of priorities among different programs they could run and results they 
could seek to achieve; and  
(3) treating their own projected impacts as promises they have made to the public and to 
intended beneficiaries about how efficiently and effectively they will use the 
publicly- and privately-provided resources with which they are working. 
 
Alternatively, we could as a society redefine the terms on which nonprofits receive public tax 
subsidies, requiring that they specify in advance what they will accomplish, and developing 
mechanisms for reviewing their choices of goals and their performance, withholding the benefits 
of tax subsidies in cases where goals are either not agreed or not met. 
 
Opting out: Defining two classes of nonprofit organizations 
 
Some nonprofit organizations might not want to be held (either voluntarily or on a mandatory 
basis) to the standards of accountability suggested here as appropriate for organizations that are 
receiving taxpayer subsidies.  They may wish to pursue ideas or approaches that they do not wish 
to explain to others or to defend, or for which they are not prepared to make auditable activity-
level or impact claim commitments.  For example, their purposes may be expressive, rather than 
impact-oriented, and they may not wish to be induced to make impact claims or to present 
evidence of results.  If we were to adopt standards that organizations accepting public taxpayer 
subsidies (through the mechanisms described above) had to meet the kinds of more stringent 
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forms of accountability described here, it seems reasonable to permit organizations that do not 
wish to meet those standards to opt out by eschewing the public subsidies that qualified 
organizations generally receive.  Thus, we would define two categories of nonprofit 
organizations: 
 
(1) those that accept public subsidies, and are required to meet the corresponding standards 
(whatever those may be established to be); and 
 
(2) those that eschew the public subsidies, and are required to meet correspondingly lower 
demands for accountability. 
 
The characteristics of nonprofit organizations that accept the public subsidies would thus be: 
 
(1) No one is allowed to own any residual value of the organization, and all funds must 
be used to serve the organization’s stated mission interests; 
(2) Liabilities of trustees or directors and managerial officers for actions taken in good 
faith to serve the organization’s mission are limited; 
(3) Net earnings of the organization are exempted from income tax; 
(4) Charitable contributions to the organization are deductible from income or from 
estate valuations before income or gift and estate taxes are calculated; 
(5) Property owned and used by the organization in the pursuit of its mission are exempt 
from local property taxes. 
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(6) The organization must meet the higher standards of accountability associated with 
receipt of public tax subsidies.  In particular (and in addition to other requirements), 
it must articulate a set of auditable mission goals – its “impact claims” – which will 
be treated as a promise to perform. 
 
The characteristics of nonprofit organizations that opt not to receive public tax subsidies would 
thus be: 
 
(1) No one is allowed to own any residual value of the organization, and all funds must 
be used to serve the organization’s stated mission interests; 
(2) There is no limitation of liability for actions by directors or trustees and managerial 
officers beyond what is provided for for-profit organizations; 
(3) Net earnings of the organization are taxable; 
(4) Contributions to the organization are not deductible from income or from estate 
valuations before income or gift and estate taxes are calculated; 
(5) Property owned by the organization is subject to local property taxes; 
(6) The organization is required to meet correspondingly lower standards of 
accountability, mainly in the form of financial stewardship and reporting. 
 
Do we ask that nonprofits aspire, that they try – or that they deliver?  
 
The standards and mechanisms of accountability we establish for nonprofit organizations that are 
receiving substantial public tax subsidies will determine what constitutes the social quid pro quo 
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for receipt of those public funds.  Under current law, the main requirement is that nonprofits 
aspire to produce benefits (and keep themselves and others from stealing the money) – any other 
performance pressures they face are either self-imposed or imposed by donors in the context of 
contribution agreements.  We could, either voluntarily or as a legal mandate, raise these 
standards.  We could require effort – that nonprofit organizations receiving public funds engage 
in activities that reasonable people would agree are directed in good faith toward the provision of 
intended, mission-described social benefits.  Or, more boldly still, we could require the 
articulation of a specific, auditable claim of results that the organization promises to achieve.  If 
we build the mechanisms of higher accountability carefully, one important result that would be 
reasonable to expect is that society will get a greater social return for its already very significant 
financial investment in the activities of nonprofit organizations. 
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